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This paper has a very modest goal. It intends to serve as a first attempt at 
understanding the widespread notion that today’s conservatism, at least as far 
as the Anglo-American version, commonly called ‘neo’ – conservatism is con-
cerned, is somehow different from earlier, more seren  versions of conserva-
tism. Not for today’s conservatives F. J. C. Hearnshow’s dictum that: ‘It is com-
monly sufficient for practical purposes if conservati es, without saying any-
thing, just sit and think, or even if they merely sit’ (quoted in Kirk 1993: 3). 
Though still considered by many, along with John Stuart Mill, ‘the stupid 
party’, conservatives for the past couple of decades have generally not resigned 
themselves to sitting peacefully, without as much as thinking, saying, or actu-
ally doing anything. The English commentator, Geoffrey Wheatcrof  described 
this change in conservative attitudes this way, putting a name to it along the way: 
Every Tory leader since Sir Robert Peel had implicitly agreed with his opponents that 
the future belonged with their side; that at best a rearguard action could be fought; that 
conservatism’s role was to make concessions as slowly, and with as good grace, as 
possible. That is, until Margaret Thatcher. She wasthe first Tory leader who did not share 
this belief (Wheatcroft 1996). 
Beginning with Margaret Thatcher in Britain, and with Ronald Reagan in the 
U.S., conservatism has, most uncharacteristically, become a fighting faith. Or, 
to put it another way: it has become what many of its adherents since the time 
of Peel would have forcefully insisted it could or should never become – that 
is, a full-fledged political ideology (meaning a distinctive, more or less coher-
ent system of political beliefs with a view to informing political action). 
Samuel Huntington’s influential article ‘Conservatism as an Ideology’ (1957) 
differentiates its subject from other examples of the species by describing it as 
a kind of positional, or situational belief-system, continuously responding to 
the challenges of the times, expressed in rival (we are tempted to say ‘real’) 
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ideologies, but itself lacking substantive content, that is a permanent, idiosyn-
cratic core of propositions. So, depending as always, on the meaning of the 
word, you might summarize Huntington’s argument in Conservatism as an 
Ideology this way: It really isn’t. 
Another thinker, Michael Oakeshott, most explicitly and unapologetically takes 
this later position – that conservatism is not an ideology; or, perhaps more ac-
curately: that, although you could be a conservative (and not just in politics, 
either), there’s really no such thing as conservatism (as an ideology) – as those 
who adhere to an ideology are the exact opposite of a c nservative. 
Oakeshott’s understanding of conservatism, of course, a  one of his friends, 
Professor John Casey notes ‘could not be further from the world-view of the 
Conservative party’ during the years of Thatcherism (Casey 1993: 63).2 
This paper does not consider it as one of its aims to give a comprehensive defi-
nition of conservatism, nor, correspondingly, the adjudication of the conserva-
tive credentials of the various authors it deals with; it takes for granted the sup-
posed conservatism of its subjects, on account of their self-definition, or com-
mon perception. It takes as its point of departure a not terribly controversial fea-
ture of conservatism, indeed, the most usual of suspect  when it comes to the 
so-called ‘list’ approach to conservatism as an ideology, and which at the same 
time is also the usual basis for denying conservatism’s ideological nature. This 
feature might be called anti-rationalism (and is leading the list of, e.g., An-
thony Quinton in The Politics of Imperfection as the recognition of the intel-
lectual imperfection of human beings). 
This author happens to believe that the well-known co servative arguments, 
following from this scepticism concerning the capabilities of human reason, 
against rationalistic plans of perfecting social institutions are rather powerful. 
They are also of an unmistakably negative nature. It’s not too difficult to see 
how this alleged negativity renders conservatism soewhat helpless in the face 
of what conservatives perceive the relentless onslaught of rationalistic plans of 
reform (taking the forms of various ideologies) which for the best part of the 
last century have been the chief characteristic of the times. Some conservatives 
reacted to this constellation of events with a certain measure of resigned pessi-
mism, believing that the future indeed belonged with the opposing side; ‘that at 
best a rearguard action could be fought; that conservatism’s role was to make 
concessions as slowly, and with as good grace, as possible.’ 
                                                
2 On the other hand there are those who would characterize conservatism as a distinct political 
ideology from its earliest beginnings, which, for example, Robert Nisbet does without the 
slightest hesitation in his Conservatism: Dream and Reality (1991). 
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But others decided to take up arms against this sea of troubles, and by opposing 
try to end them. This, they reasoned, could only be done by adopting an ideol-
ogy of their own, to arm themselves with in the battle of ideas. This is what I 
shall call the ‘ideologization’ of conservatism. Flashing a light on the origins of 
this feature of contemporary Anglo-American (neo)conservatism is what the 
exceedingly modest aim of this paper is. It will also not try to answer the ques-
tion if the whole enterprise amounts to a setting rght of the out of joint time, or 
a particularly clever way of suicide. 
Michael Oakeshott and the ‘intimations of tradition’ 
Being conservative, according to Michael Oakeshott, and in his famous words, 
means, among other things, preferring 
‘the familiar to the unknown, […] the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to 
the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant, the sufficient to the 
superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, present laughter to utopian bliss’ (Oake-
shott 1991: 408). 
In other words, it means exhibiting a certain kind of disposition in manners of 
thought and behaviour. What it most emphatically does not mean is subscribing 
to a certain set of beliefs, or general principles, ‘a creed or a doctrine’ – an ide-
ology. 
Ideologies belong to the rationalist approach of politics, which takes as its 
starting point a system of theoretical, abstract ideas, and intends to use it as a 
guide (a ‘crib’) to political action. 
The problem with ideologies, according to Oakeshott, is that they can never 
include the whole, or even the best part of our knowledge about politics, as part 
of that knowledge is of a practical nature, that is of a kind that can’t be for-
malized (set in rules, put into books). In fact all human knowledge has two 
distinct elements: technical and practical. Of these two, only the former is 
available to the rationalist mind, as it is the kind that is susceptible to formal-
ization. The difference between these two kinds of knowledge is well illus-
trated by Oakeshott’s famous examples of one not being able to learn how to 
cook, or drive a car from a book. 
So Oakeshott considers political ideologies only a poor extract, a crude 
abridgement of political knowledge, and the ideological manner of political 
conduct an impoverishment of politics. The fullness of political knowledge can 
only be found in the practice of a given political ommunity, in tradition. Po-





This description of the nature of politics and political knowledge drove many 
readers of Oakeshott to desperation. But Oakeshott evidently had no intention 
of letting himself goaded into answering the classic question of political ideol-
ogy. ‘Do you want to be told, that in politics there is, what certainly exists no-
where else, a mistake-proof manner of what should be one?’ Oakeshott asks 
one of his critics (Oakeshott 1991: 136).3 
However, in his ‘On being conservative’ he does give some clues as to what 
kind of political arrangements someone with a conservative disposition would 
prefer. Oakeshottian politics is above anything else one of a limited variety. For 
him, ‘governing is a specific and limited activity’. It is concerned only with the 
administration (‘the provision and custody’) of general rules of human conduct, 
‘which are understood, not as plans for imposing substantive activities, but as 
instruments enabling people to pursue the activities of their own choice with 
the minimum frustration’ (Oakeshott 1991: 424). 
As people tend to be engaged in a great variety of activities, and entertain a 
multiplicity of opinions, collisions between them are inevitable. Hence the need 
– to resolve the more consequential of these collisions – for rules of conduct, 
the making and enforcement of which constitute the offices of government. But 
to avoid imposing substantive activities, or opinions (the ‘dreams of others’) on 
people, the rules have to be g neral, and only a government that is ‘not con-
cerned with moral right and wrong’, ‘indifferent to‹truth› and ‹error› alike’ on 
the part of its subjects, is well suited to the task (Oakeshott 1991: 428-30). 
Now, Oakeshott observes that some conservatives may want to defend their 
view of the proper nature of government ‘by appealing to certain general 
ideas’. He on his part does not think that a disposition to be conservative in 
politics is ‘necessarily connected with any particular beliefs about the universe, 
about the world in general or about human conduct in general’, and has ‘noth-
ing to do with a natural law’, for example (Oakeshott 1991: 423).4 Indeed, if a 
man of this disposition is asked the question: Why ought governments to con-
duct themselves in a ‘conservative’ manner, and limit their activities to the 
administration of what is, for all practical purposes, the rule of law, Oakeshott 
thinks it entirely sufficient for him to say: ‘Why not?’ (Oakeshott 1991: 427)5 
                                                
3 Oakeshott’s intransigence concerning the role of ideology in politics is splendidly illustrated 
by the following anecdote: John Kekes, the Hungarian-born American political philosopher 
approached Michael Oakeshott on an occasion, and asked him what an American conservative 
should do, given the perhaps limited availabilty of the ‘intimations of tradition’ in his country, 
at least as compared to Professor Oakeshott’s. And the great thinker’s answer was: ‘That’s 
your problem.’ 
4 Consequently, ‘there is more to learn about this disposition from Montaigne, Pascal, Hobbes 
and Hume than from Burke or Bentham’ (Oakeshott 1991: 435). 
5 This would seem a good example of what Paul Franco, concluding his monography, some-
what euphemistically refers to as Oakeshott remaining ‘too sketchy and laconic on important 
issues’ (Franco 1990: 236). 
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As we have seen, there were others who considered it ‘commonly sufficient for 
practical purposes if conservatives, without saying a ything, just sit and think.’ 
But then again, there were some who did not. Or, rathe , rejected the label – all 
the while exposing many of the same ideas. 
F. A. Hayek and the ‘ideology of freedom’ 
In his famous essay, ‘Why I Am Not a Conservative’, F. A. Hayek gives his 
reasons not only for that, but – perhaps somewhat less famously, but none the 
less forcefully – voices his ‘increasing misgivings’ with regards to describing 
himself as a ‘liberal’, too.6 It is necessary to recognize, he writes, that what he 
means by ‘liberalism’ – and takes to be his own position – ‘has little to do with 
any political movement that goes under that name today’. Those political 
movements have ‘absorbed the crude and militant ration lism of the French 
revolution’, and are led ‘more by a desire to impose upon the world a precon-
ceived rational pattern than to provide opportunity for free growth’. 
Hayek’s kind of ‘true’ liberalism, on the other hand, ‘shares with conservatism 
a distrust of reason’, and recognizes its debt to conservative thinkers’ ‘loving 
and reverential study of the value of grown institutions’ (Hayek 1984d). 
Indeed, Hayek builds his ideas on much the same epistemological ground as 
Oakeshott. His main enemy is also ‘rationalism’, the origins of which he also 
traces back to the works of Descartes and Bacon. The problem with rationalis-
tic plans of reform is that they jeopardize the ‘spontaneous order’ of ‘grown’ 
(and not planned) social institutions, which rely on dispersed, tacit (practical) 
knowledge for their proper functioning. Hayek first took note of the importance 
of this kind of knowledge while studying the economy and the free market, but 
later he generalized his observations, and applied th m to the law, morals and 
language. 
As the rejection of political rationalism is, as wehave already noted, one of the 
basic tenets of conservatism, it is not surprising that Hayek felt the need to 
defend himself against charges of being a conservative. His defence, however, 
is made rather less convincing by the frequent citaion of Edmund Burke as the 
kind of ‘liberal’ Hayek considers himself as being, settling in the end on a term 
– ‘Old Whig’ – of a somewhat limited contemporary usefulness in his search 
for an appropriate label for his political beliefs. 
                                                
6 For those who would, on the grounds of his self-definition, protest including Hayek in a 
survey of conservative thought, along with the arguments presented in this chapter, we 
recommned considering that during a visit to the Conservative party’s research department in 
the 1970’s Margaret Thatcher reportedly slammed a copy of Hayek’s The Constitution of 





Now, Hayek, of course didn’t consider Burke a prope conservative (neither 
did Oakeshott, by the way, as we have seen). According to Hayek ‘conserva-
tism proper is a legitimate, probably necessary, and certainly widespread atti-
tude of opposition to drastic change’ – something not unlike Oakeshott’s con-
servative ‘disposition’. The problem for Hayek with this kind of conservatism 
is that 
‘by its very nature it cannot offer an alternative to the direction in which we are mov-
ing. It may succeed by its resistance to current tendencies in slowing down undesirable 
developments, but, since it does not indicate another direction, it cannot prevent their 
continuance. […] The tug of war between conservatives and progressives can only 
affect the speed, not the direction, of contemporary developments. But, though there is 
a need for a ‘brake on the vehicle of progress’, I personally cannot be content with 
simply helping to apply the brake’ (Hayek 1984d: 281-2). 
Conservatism, ‘by its distrust of theory and its lack of imagination concerning 
anything except that which experience has already proved, […] deprives itself 
of the weapons needed in the struggle of ideas.’ 
As Hayek didn’t think it would be enough for him to ‘sit and think’, he set out 
to arm himself with an ‘ideology of freedom.’ 
Oakeshott, alas, in all this saw another victory of rationalism. 
‘While formerly it was tacitly resisted and retarded by, for example, the informality of 
English politics […], that resistance has now itself been converted into an ideology. 
This is, perhaps, the main significance of Hayek’s Road to Serfdom – not the cogency 
of his doctrine, but the fact that it is a doctrine. A plan to resist all planning may be 
better than its opposite, but it belongs to the same style of politics. And only in a soci-
ety already deeply infected with Rationalism will the conversion of the traditional re-
sources of resistance to the tyranny of Rationalism into a self-conscious ideology be 
considered a strengthening of those resources.’ (Oakeshott, 1991: 26-7)7 
Sometimes it is indeed very hard not to pronounce Hayek guilty of the sin of 
‘constructivist rationalism’ that he so eloquently criticizes elsewhere. For ex-
ample, at the end of his magnum opus Law, Legislation and Liberty, he pro-
poses his own ‘model constitution’, at the centre of which we find a legislative 
body with its members elected for 15 years by the 45-year old members of 
society, from their own ranks (to better ensure competence and independence). 
But Hayek, by all means, was quite aware of the perils of his enterprise. He 
prefaces his ‘model constitution’ with a quote from Hume – from whom, re-
member, Oakeshott suggests we may learn more about the conservative dispo-
sition than from Burke, or, we might suppose, Hayek –, who also closed his 
Essays with The Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth. 
                                                
7 Supplementing Oakeshott’s opinion of Hayek, his remark about the post-War years: ‘There 
were a lot of Viennese comedians around Cambridge those days’ (Minogue 1993: 96). Al-
though he might have meant Wittgenstein. 
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‘In all cases it must be advantageous to know what is the most perfect in the kind, that 
we may be able to bring any real constitution or form of government as near as it is 
possible, by such gentle alterations and innovations as may not give too great a distur-
bance to society’ (quoted in Hayek 1984a: 382). 
We might get closer to understanding Hayek’s programme, if we inspect in a 
bit more detail his thinking in relation to Hume. In his essay The legal and 
political philosophy of David Hume (1711-1776) Hayek quotes with eminent 
agreement S. S. Wolin, who wrote about Hume that he ‘turned against the 
enlightenment its own weapons’, when he undertook ‘t  whittle down the 
claims of reason by the use of rational analysis’. According to Hayek, Hume, 
building on his sceptical theory of knowledge, which recognized the ‘narrow 
bounds of human understanding’, produced a theory of the growth of human 
institutions, the anti-rationalist nature of which s reflected in Hayek’s favourite 
Hume quotation: ‘the rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our 
reason’. As for the potential ideological use of his theories (such as proposing a 
model constitution), Hayek observes: 
‘The transition from explanation to ideal does not, however, involve him in any ille-
gitimate confusion of explanation and recommendation. Nobody was more critical of, 
or explicit about the impossibility of, a logical transition from the is to the ought’ 
(Hayek 1991: 107-8). 
Hayek’s stated purpose with his ‘model constitution’ is ‘not to propose a con-
stitutional scheme for present application’. He emphatically does ‘not wish to 
suggest that any country with a firmly established constitutional tradition 
should replace its constitution by a new one drown up on the lines suggested.’ 
He even recognizes the importance of ‘the background of traditions and be-
liefs’ which make constitutions work in these countries – as the constitutions 
themselves do not explicitly state all that they presuppose (or sometimes do not 
even exist in written from). 
But, as Hayek notes, ‘very few countries in the world are in the fortunate posi-
tion of possessing a strong constitutional tradition.’ So, besides giving the ideas 
discussed in the preceding parts of his book ‘a more definite shape’, by outlin-
ing a model constitution embodying them, he also would like to help new de-
mocracies (and also, new supra-national institutions), which do not have the 
privilege of relying on the ‘intimations of tradition’ (Hayek 1984a: 384-5). 
Not that Hayek – as we have just seen – would necessarily dismiss those ‘inti-
mations.’ In fact, quite the opposite is the case. On many occasions, he makes it 
clear that the ‘ideology’ that he champions is close y linked to tradition. In an 
essay devoted to the importance of general principles in politics, he writes that 
those principles ‘have never been fully articulated in constitutional documents’, 
and have, in fact, usually been only ‘vaguely and dimly perceived.’ What’s 





‘This is not to say that these ‘principles’ must necessarily take the form of articulated 
rules. Principles are often more effective guides for action when they appear as no 
more than an unreasoned prejudice, a general feeling that certain things ‘are not done’; 
while as soon as they are explicitly stated speculation begins about their correctness 
and their validity.’ 
On the other hand: 
‘Once the instinctive certainty is lost, perhaps as a result of unsuccessful attempts to 
put into words principles that had been observed ‘intuitively’, there is no way of re-
gaining such guidance other than to search for a corre t statement of what before was 
known implicitly’ (Hayek 1984c: 304-5). 
Though undoubtedly Hayek strived for a ‘doctrine’, it was ‘the doctrine which 
is at the basis of the common tradition of the Anglo-Saxon countries’ (Hayek 
1984d: 293). 
In addition, the principles proposed by Hayek are, not just in origin, but in sub-
stance as well, not at all unlike those that Oakeshott hinted at being comfort-
able with. Among them Hayek gives pride of place to the rule of law, which he 
conceptualizes in much the same way as Oakeshott: as limited government by 
general principles instead of specific commands. In fact, providing a frame-
work for this kind of government is the explicit goal of his ‘model constitu-
tion’, with the admittedly strange arrangements made for exercising the legis-
lative function being intended as a safeguard against the usurpation of that 
function by more results-oriented political actors. 
So, it’s not in the least bit surprising that some would write of Hayek as a con-
servative (Gray 1993), or, for that matter, of Oakeshott as liberal (Gray 1993, 
Franco 2000). And it’s hard not to feel sometimes that Oakeshott’s complaint 
about liberals – that they don’t always seem to know who their real friends 
are – is true of his relationship to Hayek just as well. 
Irving Kristol, Leo Strauss and the ‘crisis of modernity’ 
Irving Kristol, the founding father of American neoconservatism,8 opens his 
1995 essay, ‘America’s ‘Exceptional’ Conservatism,’ recalling the day in 1956 
when arriving at his office at the Encounter magazine in London he found on 
his desk an unsolicited manuscript from Michael Oakeshott. (‘This, I thought, 
is the way every editor’s day should begin.’) He proceeded to read the essay, 
called ‘On Being Conservative’, with ‘pleasure and appreciation’. (‘It was 
                                                
8 I use the term ‘neoconservatism’ in two, not entirely distinct senses. My excuse is that the 
term is used, in scholarly literature as well as in political discourse, in both senses. In the first, 
more comprehensive sense it refers to late 20th century varieties of conservatism generally 
(‘new’ conservatisms, e.g. Thatcherism); in the second, narrower one to the specifically 
American version established by Mr. Kristol and his as ociates in the 1960’s and 70’s. 
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beautifully written, subtle in its argument, delicate in its perceptions, and full of 
sentences and paragraphs that merit the attention of a thologists for decades, 
perhaps even centuries, to come.’) Then he rejected it. 
By way of explanation Kristol proposes that while admiring the essay, he 
didn’t really like it. That is, he disagreed with it. The reason was that, by his 
own account, he was ‘in the earliest stages of intellectual pregnancy with those 
attitudes and dispositions that later emerged as ‘neoconservatism.’ And Ameri-
can neoconservatism is very different from the kind of ideal English conserva-
tism that Oakeshott was celebrating so brilliantly’ (Kristol 1995: 375-6). 
The reason why Kristol thinks ‘Oakeshott’s conservative disposition runs 
squarely against the American grain’ is the kind of ‘ideological patriotism’ 
inherent in the American character; a consequence of the widely noted fact that 
the United States is a ‘creedal nation’, united, as a nation of immigrants, by a 
‘civic religion.’ All this explains, according to Kristol that when he, this time as 
an editor at Basic Books, eventually published Oakeshott’s Rationalism in 
Politics in the United States it sold a measly 600 copies. 
Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom, on the other hand, proved a huge publishing 
success in America, selling 600.000 copies (at one point even making it into 
Readers’ Digest9). Kristol in the same essay traces back the roots f post-World 
War II American conservatism to that publishing event,10 the importance of 
which he sees not primarily in converting people from ‘statism’ to ‘antista-
tism’, but in intellectually mobilizing people who were already antistatist and 
pro-free market, and making their views more respectable. Though confessing 
to never having read The Road to Serfdom, he expresses his admiration of 
Hayek’s later writings concerning intellectual history and political philosophy 
(Kristol 1995: 378).11 
By Kristol’s famous definition a neoconservative is ‘a liberal who has been 
mugged by reality’ (ad notam: a conservative is a liberal who has been 
mugged). Like Hayek, neoconservatives (many of them one time liberals or 
radicals) were deeply unsatisfied with contemporary tu ns of American liber-
alism, so, like Hayek, they took to reclaiming ‘the traditional principles of lib-
eralism from the leftists who had hijacked and corrupted it’ (Podhoretz 1996). 
                                                
9 This, one hardly needs to add, says nothing about the intellectual qualities of the two books 
(Cassidy, 2000). 
10 So does George H. Nash in his The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America (N sh 
1976: 4). 
11 Another prominent neoconservative, Michael Novak in his The Spirit of Democratic Capital-
ism cites Hayek’s ‘Why I Am Not a Conservative’ when wanting to identify the intellectual 





But, in fact neoconservatives went further than the Hayekian project of resur-
recting classical liberalism. In his ‘Autobiographical Memoir’ Kristol mentions 
Leo Strauss as one of only two thinkers who had the greatest effect on his in-
tellectual formation (the other was Lionel Trilling).12 Strauss, who had emi-
grated from Nazi Germany to America, saw as the central problem of his time 
the ‘crisis of modernity’. This meant primarily the loss of faith on the part of 
the West in its own moral ideals, which loss manifested itself in a lack of po-
litical resolve (or in Machiavelli’s famous term ‘virtu’ ) and a consequent un-
readiness to act in defence of those ideals. ‘Once we realize that the principles 
of our actions have no other support than our blind choice, we really do not 
believe in them any more. We cannot wholeheartedly act upon them any more’, 
writes Strauss in the Introduction to his Natural Right and History (Strauss 
1953: 6). 
Strauss thought that this crisis was, so to speak, encoded in the DNA of moder-
nity, and he traced it back to the liberalism of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, 
and their break with the ancient tradition of political philosophy. 
For Hobbes obviously starts, not, as the great tradition did, from natural ‘law’, i.e. from 
an objective order, but from natural ‘right’, i.e. from an absolutely justified subjective 
claim which, far from being dependent on any previous law, order, or obligation, is 
itself the origin of all law, order, or obligation (Strauss 1952: VIII.). 
But, by giving up on natural law, the moderns gave up on political philosophy 
(defined as the search for truth in matters of politics) as well, substituting it 
with a ‘value-neutral’ social science built on the Weberian distinction between 
‘fact’ and ‘value’. This, according to Strauss, inexorably leads to nihilism, in-
deed ‘it is identical with nihilism’ (Strauss 1953: 6). 
The only cure could be found in the writings of the‘ancients’, Plato and Aris-
totle, and in their ideas about ‘classical natural right’ (or, rather, natural law) 
and the proper place of philosophy in the life of the community.  
Strauss wrote in a letter that he really believed ‘that the perfect political order, 
as Plato and Aristotle sketched it, is the perfect political order’. However, he 
also agreed with the ancients on the chance realization of this perfect political 
order. So, in another place he wrote that ‘liberal or constitutional democracy 
comes closer to what the classics demanded than any other alternative that is 
viable in our age’ (quoted in Deutsch and Soffer, 1987: 8). 
                                                
12 The Straussian connection to neoconservatism has been much in focus recently. Articles e.g. 
in The New York Times and The Economist, though sometimes with debatable conclusions, 
nevertheless quite clearly documented the intellectual and personal influences linking Strauss, 
his disciples and some of today’s leading neoconservative figures (Atlas 2003; The Economist 
2003; see also: Heer 2003). 
CONSERVATISM AS AN IDEOLOGY REVISITED… 177 
So, by all probabilities, and contrary to much what is said today about Strauss 
and his followers, their aim really has been the prse vation of liberal democ-
racy, as it is practiced, first of all, in the United States, and which they regard 
roughly as their hero, Churchill did: the worst form of government except all 
those other forms that have been tried from time to time. But they do have 
some reservations about the tenacity of liberal democracy. They think it is, by 
its very nature, vulnerable in a confrontation with despotism, lacking the moral 
basis for making the necessary sacrifices which are needed to persevere in such 
a confrontation.13 
So for them, an Oakeshottian-Hayekian ‘rule of law’ government, which is ‘not 
concerned with moral right and wrong’, ‘indifferent to ‹truth› and ‹error› alike’ 
and has ‘nothing to do with natural law,’ emphatically wouldn’t suffice. For 
Straussians, as we have seen, government has everything to do with natural 
law.14 
The Straussians, of course, are not alone in having serious reservations about 
liberal democracy. Alexis de Tocqueville’s contemporary, Benjamin Constant 
had basically the same insight about the difference between the liberty of the 
ancients and the moderns. For the former, liberty meant a right to participate in 
the matters of the community, often bought by paying the price of personal 
sacrifice; for the latter, a right to an undisturbed private sphere. Modern bour-
geois societies would much rather make love, or at least commerce, than war. 
But sometimes, in the face of tyranny, making war is what is called for. 
Indeed, the great animating passion of neoconservatives in the 1970’s was their 
implacable anti-communism. Norman Podhoretz writes, paraphrasing George 
Will, who noted about bankers during the Polish crisis that they evidently loved 
commerce more than they loathed communism: neoconservatives did not love 
anything more than they loathed communism (Podhoretz 1996). 
It was in the realm of foreign policy where neoconservatives made their most 
determined stand in the 1970’s and 80’s, and they have remained (or, rather, 
have reemerged as) the most influential. 
                                                
13 One of the favourite texts of neoconservatives is Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War. That war, 
of course, was lost by Athens, and won by Sparta. 
14 Libertarian critics of the neoconservatives had a point when they recently wrote that ‘merely 






Jeane Kirkpatrick and the ‘rationalist perversion of politics’ 
Just as Friedrich Hayek dissociated his ideas from b th conservatism and what 
he considered a flawed kind of liberalism, neoconservative foreign policy in-
tellectuals waged a two-front war against traditional conservative ‘realist’ for-
eign policy – as personified by Henry Kissinger and practiced by the Nixon and 
Ford administrations – on the one hand, and the liberal ‘idealism’ of the Carter 
presidency. 
Against the second, they deployed some thoroughly Oakeshottian arguments 
(although sometimes in the guise of Burkeanism). Perhaps the most prominent 
neoconservative foreign policy intellectual of the era, Reagan adviser Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, in the Introduction to her book of collected essays, Dictatorships 
and Double Standards, names ‘the rationalist perversion in modern politics’ as 
the source of much that is wrong with the world (recent events in Iran and 
Nicaragua, among other things). 
The essence of rationalism, as Kirkpatrick understands it, is the ‘failure to dis-
tinguish between the domains of thought and experience,’ that is between 
‘ideas and institutions’. ‘Rationalism encourages us to believe that anything 
that can be conceived can be brought into being.’ Rationalist theories ‘begin 
not from how things are but how they ought to be,’ and consist ‘in the deter-
mined effort to understand and shape people and societies on the basis of in-
adequate, oversimplified theories of human behaviour.’ It is ‘concerned more 
with the abstract than the concrete, with the possible than the probable,’ and 
less ‘with people as they are than as they might be’ (Kirkpatrick 1982: 10-1). 
Kirkpatrick blames the ‘rationalist spirit of the age’ for viewing ‘each situation 
as a tabula rasa on which a plan can be imposed’, and taking no note of the 
fact that 
‘institutions are patterned human behaviour that exist and function through the people 
of society, and that radically changing institutions means radically changing the lives of 
people who may not want their lives changed. […] When we forget, or wilfully choose 
to ignore, the intractability of human behavior, the complexity of human institutions, 
and the probability of unanticipated consequences, we do so at great risk, and often 
immense human cost’ (Kirkpatrick 1982: 17-8). 
In 1981 a speech delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations, entitled ‘Ideas 
and Institutions’, Kirkpatrick supplemented the above with a lengthy quote 
from Burke’s Reflections, and expressed her belief that  
‘we have had enough rationalism in our foreign policy’ and recommended instead 
taking ‘the cure of history’ which is ‘nothing more or less than the cure of reality’ 
(Kirkpatrick 1983: 44). 
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But neoconservatives were no fans of foreign policy realism in the Kissingerian 
mould, either. 
Their main problem with realism was its ideological indifference. According to 
this school of thought, in foreign policy there is no place for morality. The only 
thing that counts is the geopolitical balance of powers. Injecting notions about 
the moral superiority of one of the participants into the international system 
only brings instability. 
Neoconservatives long argued that when confronting the Soviet Union, ideol-
ogy was paramount. It was so on the part of the Soviets, who probably didn’t 
consider themselves representatives of a ‘normal’ ntio  state, ‘seeking its 
place under the sun.’ But it was still more important on the part of the United 
States. 
As Jeane Kirkpatrick wrote: ‘the notion that foreign policy should be oriented 
toward balance of power politics, or realpolitik, is totally foreign to the Ameri-
can tradition.’ Governments must act from an ideal of their societies, especially 
in democracies, where moral legitimacy is a persistent question in politics. 
Irving Kristol, similarly, insisted that ‘pure amoral Realpolitik is no part of the 
American political tradition,’ and warned against the nation sacrificing its 
moral foundations and thus ‘casting a pall of illegitimacy’ over its ideals. Nor-
man Podhoretz said that realism ‘robbed the Soviet-American conflict of the 
moral and political dimensions’, thus jeopardizing Americans’ will to make the 
necessary sacrifices to pursue the Cold War effectiv ly (quoted in Hoeveler 
1991: 152-71). 
In a speech entitled ‘The Reagan Reassertion of Western Values’ Kirkpatrick 
warned that 
‘it is not only conceivable that an affluent and technologically advanced democratic 
civilization may succumb to one that is distinctly inferior in the wealth and well-being 
of its people. This has occurred more than once in history. The decisive factor in the 
rise and fall of nations is what Machiavelli called virtu, meaning vitality and a capacity 
for collective action. In the battle with totalitari nism, a free society has enormous 
advantages of which we are all well aware. But without the political will not merely to 
survive but to prevail, these advantages count for nought’ (Kirkpatrick 1983: 31). 
And in another, ‘The Reagan Phenomenon and the Liberal Tradition’, after 
noting that the presence of intellectuals at relatively high policy-making posi-
tions in the Reagan administration (Kirkpatrick was a professor of political 
science before signing on as President Reagan’s UN envoy) signals that ‘there 
is something ideologically self-conscious going on’in American politics, she 
stated that ‘the president and many of his principal advisers see themselves as 





William Kristol, Robert Kagan and the ‘laying of th e foundations’ 
The successes of the Reagan years however – especially after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the ‘evil empire’ – gave way in the 1990’s to what the neo-
conservatives saw as the complacency of the first Bu h and the Clinton presi-
dencies. In a Foreign Affairs article published in 1996, William Kristol and 
Robert Kagan – representatives of a new generation of neoconservatives – find 
the foreign policy climate of the times reminiscent of the mid-1970’s (the pe-
riod of the first great neoconservative awakening). Conservatives are, once 
again, ‘adrift’, leaning uncertainly ‘on some version of the conservative ‹real-
ism› of Henry Kissinger and his disciples.’ Meanwhile, the American public is 
‘indifferent, if not hostile, to foreign policy and commitments abroad, more 
interested in balancing the budget than in leading the world.’ 
What one might call (after its first and most trenchant diagnostician) the Toc-
quevillean disease of modern democratic societies – turning away from public 
affairs in favour of the pursuit of one’s and one’s family’s happiness, that is 
material well-being – is ready to reassert itself. Americans ‘have never had it so 
good’, the authors observe (mentioning as proof, among other things, ‘the secu-
rity of Americans not only to live within their own borders but to travel and do 
business safely almost anywhere in the world.’) Thelack of visible threats ‘has 
tempted Americans to absentmindedly dismantle the material and spiritual15 
foundations on which their national well-being has been based.’ As Kristol and 
Kagan see it, the post-Cold War question of ‘where is the threat?’ is miscon-
ceived. ‘In a world in which peace and American security depend on American 
power and the will to use it, the main threat the United States faces now and in 
the future is its own weakness.’ 
So, what America needs, once again, is a ‘neo-Reaganite foreign policy of mili-
tary supremacy and moral confidence,’ which would actively engage in pro-
moting American principles of governance – democracy, free markets, respect 
for liberty – abroad and also in pursuing policies ntended to bring about 
‘change of regime’ (in Iran, Cuba or China, for example). This ‘more elevated 
vision’ of America’s international role would consist in a ‘benevolent global 
hegemony’ resting on the ‘strategic and ideological predominance’ of the 
United States. Kristol and Kagan even challenge the famous admonition of 
John Quincy Adams against America going abroad ‘in search of monsters to 
destroy’ with the words: ‘But why not?’ 
                                                
15 The italics from now on are added to highlight thecontinuous presence of the ideological di-
mension in neoconservative foreign policy thinking. 
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The last but one part of Kristol and Kagan’s article bears the subtitle: ‘From 
NSC-68 to 1996.’ As the authors inform us, NSC-68 was a national security 
planning document drafted in 1950 by, among others, Paul Nitze, which called 
for an all-out effort to meet the Soviet challenge, and called for a full scale 
ideological confrontation and massive increases in defence spending. Now, 
what is eminently interesting from the authors’ point of view regarding NSC-
68 is that at first, against a backdrop of an American public enjoying peace and 
prosperity, it languished. Then the North Korean invasion of South Korea 
changed that. The moral of the story, according to the authors, is that  
‘as troubles arise and the need to act becomes clear, those who have laid the founda-
tions for a necessary shift in policy have a chance to lead Americans onto a new 
course’ (Kristol and Kagan 1996). 
Michael Oakeshott, on the other hand, calls the approach in which ‘arrange-
ments of a society are made to appear, not as manners of behaviour, but as 
pieces of machinery to be transported about the world indiscriminately,’ ‘one 
of the most insidious current misunderstandings of political activity’ (Oake-
shott 1991: 130). 
Conclusion 
Oakeshott, in his famous metaphor, described politics this way: 
‘In political activity, then, men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither 
harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting place nor appointed desti-
nation. The enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel; the sea is both friend and en-
emy; and the seamanship consists in using the resources of a traditional manner of be-
haviour in order to make friend of every hostile occasion’ (Oakeshott 1991: 127). 
The Straussians would obviously contest this reduction (as they would see it) of 
politics to a ‘traditional manner of behaviour’. After Plato, they would say that 
the ‘ship of state’ is best guided by the philosopher, relying on the resources of 
reason, not tradition.16 
                                                
16 The aims of the Straussians in this respect are well illustrated by the title of this selection of 
Strauss’ essays: The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism.They wouldn’t necessarily dis-
agree with the part concerning the sea being boundless and bottomless, though. As Robert 
Devigne observes, according to the Straussians ‘a lack of belief in truth is not theoretically 
wrong,’ it only ‘creates dangerous political conditions’ (Devigne 1994: 193). What they 
would probably strongly object to is letting the crew in on the bottomlessness and boundless-
ness of the sea – unlike the philosophers, the people can’t handle the truth (or lack thereof) 
very well. Given Strauss’ well-known preference for the ‘esoteric’ mode of writing, it always 
carries a certain amount of risk to venture into unravelling Straussian doctrine. Nevertheless, 
if one takes Plato as seriously as, by all indications, Straussians do, one can’t discount the use 





Among the ‘extremes’ of opinion represented by Oakeshott and the Straus-
sians, Edmund Burke seems to be occupying a middle ground – as it is to be 
expected from a practicing politician. Concluding his Reflections, he recom-
mends his opinions in the following manner: 
‘They come from one […] who wishes to preserve consistency; but who would pre-
serve consistency by varying his means to secure the unity of his end; and, when the 
equipoise of the vessel in which he sails may be endangered by overloading it upon one 
side, is desirous of carrying the small weight of his reasons to that which may preserve 
its equipoise’ (Burke 1999: 365). 
Indeed, Burke seems to function as a kind of litmus test for the varieties of 
modern conservatism. As we have seen, he was too ide logical for Oakeshott, 
while being, at the same time, too ‘parochial’ for St auss.17 Nevertheless, he 
was just about right for Hayek. He wasn’t shy of applying reason, as one of a 
variety of means, but only as a counterweight, in the service of the ultimate end 
of keeping the vessel in which we sail ‘afloat on an even keel’. 
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RESÜMEE 
Zurück zur Ideologie des Konservativismus: 
der Neokonservativismus 
TIBOR MÁNDI 
Ausgangspunkt der Studie ist der vielzitierte Artikel von Samuel Huntington 
aus dem Jahre 1957 mit dem Titel Conservatism as an Ideology. Er beschreibt 
den Konservativismus in diesem Artikel als eine Artpositionierte Ideologie, 
deren Inhalt sich flexibel an die Herausforderungen d r gegebenen historischen 
Epoche anpaßt, jedoch eines nur für ihn charakteristischen substantivischen 
Kerns ermangelt. Ziel der Studie ist die Darstellung dessen, wie sich der tradi-
tionelle anglo-amerikanische Konservativismus im Laufe der vergangenen 
Jahrzehnte aus einer Antiideologie mit den von Huntington beschriebenen 
Merkmalen in den „Neokonservativismus” mit starken ideologischen Zügen 
umgestaltet hat. Der erste Teil der Studie ruft die Tätigkeit von Michael Oa-
keshott, dem paradigmatischen Denker des theoriefeindlichen, traditionsgebun-
denen Konservativismus in Erinnerung, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die von 
der Rationalismus-Kritik des Autors gespielten Rolle in der Verwerfung des 
ideologischen Politisierens. Das nächste Kapitel stel t dar, wie sich im Denken 
von Friedrich Hayek die der Oakeshottschen Kritik sehr ähnliche Kritik des 
Rationalismus mit der Anforderung der Erarbeitung der „Ideologie der Frei-
heit” verknüpft (welche Ideologie die größtenteils auch von Michael Oakeshott 
akzeptierten Züge des klassischen Liberalismus aufweist). Am Ende der Studie, 
zum Abschluß des ideengeschichtlichen Überblicks wird untersucht, wie die 
von der politischen Philosophie von Leo Strauss befruchtete Liberalismus- und 
Modernitätskritik der amerikanischen neokonservativen Autoren zur entschlos-
senen Bejahung der ideologischen politischen Auftritts führt. Die letzten zwei 
Kapitel stellen die Wirkung der neokonservativen Ideologie auf den theoreti-
schen Hintergrund der amerikanischen Außenpolitik dar, wozu die Texte von 
Jeane Kirkpatrick aus den 1980-er Jahren, bzw. von William Kristol und Ro-
bert Kagan aus den 1990-er Jahren herangezogen werden. Dementsprechend ist 
das Ziel der vorliegenden Studie nicht die Aufdeckung des ideologischen Hin-
tergrundes der amerikanischen Außenpolitik, sondern sie will lediglich – wie 
dies im Titel des letzten Kapitels angedeutet ist – durch das kurze Aufzeichnen 
der „Grundsteinlegung” zu einem besseren Verständnis ieses Hintergrundes 
beitragen. 
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